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Abstract: The study examines evidence for the transmission of the US and EU financial crises via
investor holdings into the Chilean stock market following two global financial crises, in 2008 and
2011. The study modified the models of Bekaert et al. (2014), and Dungey and Gajurel (2015) on
the 2007–2009 global financial crisis and extends the period to include the European debt crisis of
2010–2011. The study produced three main contributions. First, changes in the equity holdings
of retail investors were a key source of contagion following the 2008 US financial crisis. Second,
investor herding during the 2011 financial crisis is shown to be low based on the co-movement of
equity holdings between the four investor groups studied. Third, investor behavior during the
2011 EU crisis differs from that of the 2008 US financial crisis, which we attribute to firms in Chile
adopting international financial reporting standards (IFRS) and improving their corporate governance.
We compared the findings to the prior contagion studies that rely on Chilean return data to highlight
the contributions to international financial research, particularly as it relates to the functioning of
emerging capital markets during financial crises.
Keywords: stock market contagion; global financial crises; Chilean stock market; investor herding;
investor holdings; emerging capital markets; corporate governance
JEL Classification: G11; G15; G40
1. Introduction
Investor herd behavior is defined as an intention of investors to mimic the behavior of other
investors. This is a psychological behavior of market participants, and finance researchers have
detected the presence of herding by looking at the relationship between individual firm stock returns
and the average market returns. It is argued that investors ignore the fundamental analysis to explain
stock prices’ movements and instead base their decisions on aggregate market behavior, which has been
found to be the case during the periods of large market movements (Chang et al. 2000; Bui et al. 2018).
This may be the case with the coronavirus-related financial shock that is rattling the global financial
markets in 2020. Hence, to study the 2020 global financial crises, it would be important to gain a better
understanding of the reasons for the 2008 and 2011 crises. Bui et al. (2018) found that investor herd
behavior is driven by both up and down overall market returns and showed that the variations in
US stock market returns (not the Hong Kong stock market) were responsible for herd behavior in the
frontier market of the Vietnamese stock exchange. Bekaert et al. (2014) and Dungey and Gajurel (2015)
addressed the shortcoming in the literature on the co-movement of equity market returns surrounding
the 2008 US mortgage crisis. The term “spillover effect” refers to the historical or expected cross-border
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co-movement in asset prices, while the term “contagion” is reserved for unexpected or excessive
spillover and is typically associated with negative shocks to the global financial system, for example,
the 2020 global shock related to the coronavirus pandemic. The tendency of investors to sell in
unison during a global financial market panic is termed investor “herding” and provides a potential
explanation for a portion of the observed global co-movement in asset prices. Negative aspects of this
type of contagion can be severe and include a reduction in the benefits from portfolio diversification,
adverse effects on wealth and economic growth, and greater risk management issues for investors and
policy makers (Connolly and Wang 2000; Kyle and Xiong 2001).
This study differs from previous contagion studies by examining changes in investors’ equity
holdings instead of equity returns. The objective is to determine if the rebalancing of equity portfolios by
insiders, institutional investors, and retail investors is useful for studying the transmission of spillover,
contagion, and investor herding during a global financial crisis (referred to as a GFC) into an emerging
capital market. Although the methodology can be applied to any country, the current study examines
the Chilean equity market during the period 2007–2013, a period that includes two GFC’s—the US
mortgage crisis and the EU debt crisis. Studies by Bekaert et al. (2014) and Dungey and Gajurel (2015)
spanned the period 2007–2009 and did not include an analysis of the EU debt crisis. A synthesis of
those two studies suggests that the Chilean equity market response to the US mortgage crisis was
driven by excess movement in Chilean equity returns relative to expected returns based on company
fundamentals. This type of contagion is referred to as “domestic” contagion by Bekaert et al. (2014)
and as “idiosyncratic” contagion by Dungey and Gajurel (2015).
The additional feature of the 2007–2013 study period is that it includes the adoption of international
financial reporting standards (IFRS) by Chilean firms in 2009, which required the voluntary adoption
of fair value accounting standards during the period 2009–2013. Firms in the study began voluntarily
adopting fair value standards in 2009, introducing the possibility that changes in the reporting
environment may explain changes in equity holdings, given that the US mortgage crisis occurred
pre-adoption and the EU debt crisis occurred post-adoption.
In emerging markets, insiders are long-term investors with superior information on the value of
the firm relative to outside investors. Hence, if a GFC causes firm value to deviate from intrinsic value,
then insiders might see it as an opportunity to increase their equity investment positions during a
period in which outsiders are reducing their equity holdings. On the other hand, since insiders already
control the majority of the equity shares, they may not feel the urge to interfere and “catch a falling
knife” when their own company share prices are tumbling. Therefore, a critical tradeoff that arises
during a GFC is the degree to which informed insiders are willing to ignore a temporary increase
in risk and uncertainty and step-in to purchase shares they view as temporarily undervalued in an
emerging market. A reason this tradeoff is crucial is that without insider buying, emerging markets
with highly concentrated ownership may become illiquid during episodes of panic selling during a
GFC. However, if informed insiders view these departures from intrinsic value as a buying opportunity,
then they serve an invaluable role as liquidity providers to the market during periods of contagion.
Additionally, this role of insiders would be more important in an emerging capital market than in a
developed capital market because of the limited flexibility of the central bank and security regulators
to avert the effects of a GFC.
The US is the top foreign source of investment in Chilean equity and investment fund shares, by
value of holdings. Following the US, the EU countries represent seven of the next nine sources of
foreign investment in Chilean equity and investment fund shares1. Therefore, international investors
in Chilean securities introduce a mechanism through which foreign shocks can enter Chile’s financial
markets. Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) suggest that financial panics create illiquid markets when foreign
1 From Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey 2013, IMF Table 13: Portfolio Investment Liabilities: Top Ten Economies by
Size of Liabilities/ equity and investment fund shares, for Chile. http://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=32986.
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sellers flood the market with sell orders at “fire sale” prices and flee less developed emerging markets
for safe havens in developed countries. Hence, an adverse economic shock in the US or EU may force
international retail investors and mutual fund managers to sell their Chilean equity holdings to meet
margin calls and redemption requests. In this manner, changes in the Chilean equity holdings of
international investors could play an important role in the transmission of a foreign-sourced financial
crisis into the Chilean stock market.
A source of significant local institutional investment in Chile is its system of private pension funds.
Chilean law limits the level of foreign securities that pension funds can hold. Thus, the exposure of
local pension funds to foreign equity markets is limited, thereby reducing the ability of pension funds
to serve as a transmission mechanism for foreign-sourced crises and contagions.
According to Gillian and Starks (2003), the typical retail investor is less sophisticated than
institutional fund managers are, even though retail investors may be rational in the short-term during
a GFC. Furthermore, retail investors include both domestic and foreign investors, and may be more
prone to panic selling and herding behavior during a GFC relative to local institutional investors.
Therefore, we explore the possibility that retail investors reduce their holdings of Chilean companies
during a GFC, which exacerbate any downward pressure on the value of equity shares traded on the
Chilean stock exchange, now referred to as the Santiago stock exchange.
Given the potential for insiders, institutional investors, and retail investors to magnify or mitigate
spillovers and contagion, we explore the relationship between the two recent past GFC’s, contagion
effects, and creditor monitoring as a corporate governance mechanism on the equity holdings during
the 2007–2013 study period. Our study departs from the existing literature on herding behavior and
contagion in a number of ways. First, we examine the relationship between equity market holdings of
investors instead of equity market returns. Our focus on equity holdings, in contrast to equity returns,
introduces the possibility of identifying the specific groups of investors who serve as a mechanism
for the transmission of foreign-sourced financial shocks into an emerging capital market. Second, we
introduce EU equity returns as an additional source of spillover and contagion allowing us to study
two crises, the US mortgage crisis and the EU debt crisis. Interestingly, the adoption of IFRS by Chilean
companies occurred between the two GFC’s and provides an opportunity to consider whether differing
responses of the investor groups to the GFC’s are attributable to IFRS adoption. Third, the use of
investor holdings rather than return models introduces a novel method of studying contagion and
herding among investor groups that can be generalized to studies of other countries and future global
financial crises.
In the current study, we view retail investors as noise traders, pension funds and insiders as
long-term value-based traders, and mutual funds as convergence traders, who may or may not be
able to distinguish liquidity shocks from shocks to company fundamentals. Hence, we posit that in
emerging capital markets, convergence traders exaggerate contagion effects if long-term investors,
such as insiders or pension funds, fail to provide the same level of liquidity that they normally provide
during a non-crisis period. Further, the link between equity market returns and aggregate household
wealth creates a means for contagion to have negative and persistent effects on the real economy due
to the behavior of retail investors. For example, Yuan (2005) found that wealth effects associated with
investors can persist even if only a small fraction of investors experience borrowing constraints.
The study’s findings support the idea that retail investors play a key role in the spread of contagion
into the Chilean stock market. We measure changes in equity holdings across investor groups to show
that herding behavior is not an important contributor to the lagged effects of the contagion. The result
demonstrates the potential for our holdings-based methodology that can complement the traditional
return-based methodology of Bekaert et al. (2014), Dungey and Gajurel (2015) and Bui et al. (2018).
The study results highlight the importance of effective stock market regulation, banking regulation,
and creditor monitoring for mitigating the effects of global financial crises.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. The second section provides an outline of
the Chilean institutional context exploring investor behaviors, the third section reviews the literature,
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and the fourth section describes the methodology leading to the development of five hypotheses, and
describes the sample, variable measurements, and the models tested. Section 5 presents the results,
and Section 6 discusses investor behaviors and concludes the study by highlighting its limitations and
future research directions.
2. Chilean Institutional Context
Chile’s private pension system is characterized by six pension funds, referred to as
“Adminstradoras de Fondos de Pensiones”, or AFP. They have restrictions on their investments,
including the size of their investment holdings in foreign securities2. They manage the pension
accounts of the citizenry who invest in them through payroll deduction made by employers. According
to Morales et al. (2013, p. 181), the AFP system had a positive effect in relation to, “(i) the emergence of
reform in the legal system and the improvement of the oversight under which firms operate, which
have influenced the quality of the external mechanisms regulating corporate governance, (ii) the
emergence of greater capital market liquidity and trading volumes, and (iii) the professionalization of
financial intermediaries”. For these reasons, the Chilean stock market is considered a highly integrated
Latin American market compared to most emerging country markets, such as the Vietnamese stock
market studied by Bui et al. (2018). This fact makes the Chilean stock market an ideal emerging capital
market to study the effects of GFC on investor holdings.
Figure 1 depicts Chilean, US, and EU annual GDP growth, and highlights the cross-country
variation of GDP during the GFC. Figure 2 displays the change in selected components of Chilean GDP.
It is noteworthy that the growth rate of Chilean total private consumption and GDP were impacted
less by the GFC’s relative to the substantial and negative growth in fixed capital formation and total
domestic spending (i.e., GDP less imports). Hence, the impact of the GFC on Chile’s economy were
varied, yet substantial, on certain components of the GDP.
Int. J. Financial Stud. 2020, 8, x FOR PEER REVIEW 4 of 22 
 
2. Chilean Institutional Context 
Chile’s private pension system is characterized by six pension funds, referred to as 
“Adminstradoras de Fondos de Pensiones”, or AFP. They have restrictions on their investments, 
including the size of their investment holdings in foreign securities2. They manage the pension 
accounts of the citizenry who invest in them through payroll deduction made by employers. 
According to Morales et al. (2013, p. 181), the AFP system had a positive effect in relation to, “(i) the 
emergence of reform in the legal system and the improvement of the oversight under which firms 
operate, which have influenced the quality of the external mechanisms regulating corporate 
governance, (ii) the emergence of greater capital market liquidity and trading volumes, and (iii) the 
professionalization of financial intermediaries”. For these reasons, the Chilean stock market is 
considered a highly integrated Latin American market compared to most emerging country markets, 
such as the Vietnamese stock market studied by Bui et al. (2018). This fact makes the Chilean stock 
market an ideal emerging capital market to study the effects of GFC on investor holdings. 
Figure 1 depicts Chilean, US, and EU annual GDP growth, and highlights the cross-country 
variation of GDP during the GFC. Figure 2 displays the change in selected components of Chilean 
GDP. It is noteworthy that the growth rate of Chilean total private consumption and GDP were 
impacted less by the GFC’s relative to the substantial and negative growth in fixed capital formation 
and total domestic spending (i.e., GDP less imports). Hence, the impact of the GFC on Chile’s 
economy were varied, yet substantial, on certain components of the GDP. 
 
Figure 1. Annual percentage change in Chile, EU, and US GDP. 
                                                 
2  Foreign equity holdings was about 33% of total AFP’s equity securities during 2009–2012. See 









2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
EU US Annual % change Chile GDP per capita PPP (US$)
l .
2 Foreign equity holdings was about 33% of total AFP’s equity securities during 2009–2012. See https://www.spensiones.cl/
apps/boletinEstadistico/. A sixth AFP was created only in 2015.
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Figure 2. Annual percentage change in GDP by selected expenditures.
Figure 3 below charts the annual returns for the Chilean, US, and EU equity markets across the
2007–2013 study period. Returns declined in all three equity markets during the 2008 US mortgage
crisis but equity market returns were more varied surrounding the EU debt crisis of 2011. Note that
the decline in the Chilean equity market return associated with the EU debt crisis was large relative to
the US crisis. Figure 4 displays household financial net worth, and shows that changes in the value of
equity shares are closely related to changes in the value of household net worth. Chilean households
experienced a twenty-percent decline in net worth during the 2008 crisis, which was comparable to
the decline in the net worth of US households. But the effect on Chilean retail investors would be
substantial. Hence, if changes in household net worth have real effects on spending and investment,
and given that changes in household net worth are associated with market returns, then it is important
to improve our understanding of the various mechanisms and policies that magnify and mitigate
contagion from GFC’s into the real economy. Figures 3 and 4 show that the recovery of Chilean
investors is slower than that of US and EU equity investors.
A key feature of Chilean equity ownership displayed in Figure 5 below is the high concentration
of shares held by insiders. Insiders are the largest shareholder group in Chile, holding over 50% of
outstanding shares. Many Chilean publicly listed companies belong to a business group, and family
insiders typically control the holding company (Lefort and Walker 2007). Further, highly concentrated
ownership in Chilean companies has been shown to affect the liquidity of shares and their governance
(Morales et al. 2013; Gjerde et al. 2013).
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Figure 5. Percentage of outstanding shares held by insiders, retail, pension funds, and mutual funds.
Holdings of insiders and retail is measured on the left axis, AFP’s (“Adminstradoras de Fondos de
Pensiones”) and mutual fund ownership is measured on the right axis.
Retail investors make up a second shareholder group, controlling the outstanding shares not held
by insiders and institutional investors. Inspection of Figure 5 reveals a noticeable decline in the equity
holdings of retail investors during 2008 and a simultaneous increase in the equity holdings of insiders
and the two groups of institutional investors. The decline in the equity holdings of retail investors in
2008 suggests that selling by retail investors may be responsible for the Chilean contagion results cited
in the Dungey and Gajurel (2015) and Bekaert et al. (2014) studies.
Institutional investors are another important group of shareholders in Chile and consist of pension
funds and mutual funds. Institutional investors control one in seven shares. In Figure 5, mutual
fund and AFP holdings were almost equal at 6% in 2009, the year that most publicly held companies
adopted IFRS and global financial markets began recovering from the US mortgage crises. Over the
next four years, AFP’s reduced their equity holdings by approximately a third, while mutual funds
increased their equity holdings by over a third before falling back towards 7% in 2013.
AFP’s have a steady inflow of funds from payroll deduction associated with Chile’s privatized
pension system. Given that AFP’s are relatively passive portfolio managers, a potential explanation for
their behavior shown in Figure 5 is that an increase in redemption orders and asset reallocation driven
by two GFC’s forced AFP managers to sell equity holdings at a rate that exceeded equity purchases
associated with payroll contributions.
Another feature apparent in Figure 5 is that relative to the change in the holdings of insiders,
the equity holdings of mutual funds and AFP’s varied significantly during the study period but trended
in opposite directions. The changes in insider holdings are much smaller in percentage terms, but a
small change in insider holdings can have a relatively large effect given that insiders own over half of
all outstanding shares on the Chilean stock market. Compared to insiders, mutual fund holdings are
much smaller. Nevertheless, mutual fund holdings of Chilean equities may represent only a portion of
their globally diversified portfolio, and they can have a variety of investment objectives.
Although mutual funds and AFP’s may share investment goals, the regulatory burden is much
less for mutual funds. The AFP’s have limitations on the amount of funds they can invest in foreign
securities, while mutual funds may have foreign management and substantial exposure to global
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markets. It follows that changes in mutual fund holdings relative to changes in AFP holdings may
be less sensitive to changes in Chilean economic conditions and more sensitive to changes in global
economic conditions. However, changes in the holdings of mutual funds and AFP’s in Figure 5 suggest
that both AFP’s and mutual funds are relatively sensitive to changes in the local market conditions,
although their incentives for holding Chilean equity shares may differ. Of note is the sharp increase
in shares held by mutual funds in 2008, perhaps due to mutual fund managers viewing Chile as a
relatively less risky equity market (compared to other emerging markets) during the 2008 GFC. Thus,
mutual fund purchases of Chilean equity shares may have mitigated the transmission of contagion
from the 2008 GFC into the Chilean equity market. This understanding helps focus our literature
review and hypotheses development.
3. Literature Review
Bekaert et al. (2014) used a three-factor asset-pricing model of country-sector equity returns
to distinguish between equity-market co-movements due to a US-specific factor, a global financial
factor, and a domestic factor. Accordingly, they state (Bekaert et al. 2014, p. 2602) “the inclusion
of three different factors in our model enables us to distinguish between three types of contagion.
Contagion may stem from the US or from the global financial sector, implying a high co-movement of
domestic sector portfolios with the US or the global factors. We will label these “US contagion” and
“global contagion”, respectively. Alternatively, while investors may continue to discriminate across
countries in response to global or US-specific shocks during crises, they may discriminate less across
stocks within countries in response to idiosyncratic, country-specific shocks, thus giving rise to what
we call domestic contagion”. Among the authors’ conclusions was the finding that domestic contagion
was the major source of contagion for Chile during the 2008 GFC.
Dungey and Gajurel (2015) refer to the global contagion as systematic contagion. Systemic contagion
is typically associated with a common global shock experienced simultaneously across markets that is
similar to the contagion caused by the 2020 coronavirus-related financial shock. They identify a second
type of contagion as idiosyncratic contagion, which occurs when a shock from a crisis originating country
spreads to another economy. For example, the US-based mortgage crisis causing price movements in the
Latin American stock markets due to fear of global debt defaults. They define a third type of contagion
as volatility contagion, which occurs when a shock causes an increase in volatility in one market and
then the effects spread to foreign markets. The authors conclude that the 2008 GFC resulted in about
one-fifth of the countries studied, including Chile, experiencing the US-sourced idiosyncratic contagion.
This result is consistent with Bekaert et al. (2014) given that the definition of domestic contagion in
that study is consistent with the definition of idiosyncratic contagion in Dungey and Gajurel (2015).
Moreover, idiosyncratic contagion was the main source of contagion for several advanced economies
including Japan and France, partly because of these markets’ greater level of integration with global
markets relative to frontier markets like Vietnam, which was studied by Bui et al. (2018).
Ma et al. (2018) noted that during crisis periods, the unavailability of liquidity is an important
channel through which market volatility affects stock returns in equity markets. These authors suggest
that market makers faced with credit constraints and heightened uncertainty pull back from providing
liquidity. Consequently, they argue that illiquidity drives firm value further from intrinsic value, which
is thought to be a feature of the 2020 coronavirus shock. Further inspection of Figure 5 above reveals
that, during our study period, the ownership level of insiders nearly mirrored that of retail investors.
Insider holdings rose (fell) when the ownership of retail investors fell (rose). Thus, it is possible that
insiders serve as liquidity providers, a role that takes on greater importance during a GFC given the
finding in Ma et al. (2018) that market makers withdraw from providing liquidity during a crisis.
Given that we use equity holdings instead of equity returns to study contagion, we review
the literature on portfolio rebalancing as potential drivers of contagion. Kodres and Pritsker (2002)
show that through cross-market portfolio rebalancing, investors transmit idiosyncratic shocks from
one market to another when they adjust their portfolios’ exposures to shared macroeconomic risks.
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Their model shows that portfolio rebalancing can generate contagion between markets that do
not directly share common economic risks. Moreover, they show that contagion among emerging
markets can occur indirectly through a third developed country (like the US) without significantly
affecting prices in the developed country. The authors identify “correlated information channels” and
“correlated liquidity shock channels” as potential mechanisms to transmit the contagion. Particularly,
Kodres and Pritsker (2002, p. 770) state that, “Under the correlated information channel, price changes
in one market are perceived as having implications for the values of assets in other markets that causes
their prices to change as well. The correlated liquidity shock channel posits that when some market
participants need to liquidate some of their assets to obtain cash, they choose to liquidate assets in a
number of markets, effectively transmitting the shock to other markets (Calvo 1999)”. Additionally,
when portfolio rebalancing occurs in markets with information asymmetries, the resulting price
co-movements are exaggerated because the order flows are misconstrued as being information-based
flows. This led them to conclude that price co-movements are exaggerated in emerging markets that
have a significant proportion of uninformed investors.
Boyer et al. (2006) provide evidence that stock market crises spread globally through the asset
holdings of international retail investors. These studies argue that uninformed but rational investors
are unable to distinguish between selling based on liquidity shocks and selling based on fundamental
economic shocks in the presence of recursive relationships between a country’s fiscal policies, monetary
policies, and market liquidity (see Chowdhury et al. 2018). This may be the case with the 2020
coronavirus shock contagion that is rattling global capital markets.
Kyle and Xiong (2001) also consider the relationship between contagion and imperfect information.
The authors separated investors into three groups, noise traders trading randomly in only one market,
long-term value-based investors trading on fundamentals and providing liquidity, and convergence
traders who trade optimally in multiple markets. Convergence traders are perfect competitors, and
rational in the sense that their trading strategies correctly take into account the effect of all market
participants on the price dynamics in more than one market. Thus, convergence traders, unlike
long-term investors, aggressively exploit short-term opportunities by taking the other side of noise
trading. On the other hand, long-term investors are not fully rational in the sense that they tend to
ignore the short-term opportunities caused by noise traders. Moreover, Kyle and Xiong (2001) argue
that it is possible for contagion to result from confused convergent traders if convergence traders
cannot distinguish between liquidity shocks and shocks to company fundamentals.
Gromb and Vayanos (2010) refer to the risk that stems from noise traders as non-fundamental risk
to emphasize the possibility that demand shocks may be unrelated to asset payoffs, which can arise
from rational short-term trading behavior by convergence traders. A consequence is that price declines
are exaggerated when arbitrageurs, such as convergence traders, are forced to liquidate their position
and long-term investors like insiders fail to provide liquidity to the market. Thus, if convergence
traders are arbitrageurs who cannot exit their positions in an illiquid market during a crisis, then they
can have a destabilizing effect on emerging markets that can lead to a market crash.
4. Methodology
The analysis attempts to measure the amount of variation in equity holdings explained by lagged
equity holdings, spillover, contagion, and control variables during the 2007–2013 study period. Total
outstanding shares in the Chilean equity market are allocated among four groups of investors according
to ownership data obtained from the Superintendcia Valores y Seguros that is referred to as the SVS,
which is the equivalent of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission in Chile. The four
ownership groups are pension funds, mutual funds, retail investors, and insiders.
A goal of modeling equity holdings instead of equity returns is to determine if any of the four
investor groups made substantial changes to their equity holdings in response to the two GFC’s within
the study period. If they did, then we can conclude that portfolio rebalancing may have served as a
mechanism to transmit contagion into the domestic economy. Furthermore, with our methodology,
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it may be possible to identify which investor groups magnified (or mitigated) contagion effects from
the GFC’s.
The spillover market’s proxies are the annual return on three foreign equity indices consisting
of an MSCI US equity index (referred to as “US Spillover”), an MSCI EU equity index (referred to as
“EU Spillover”), and an MSCI global equity index (referred to as “Global Spillover”)3. The annual
return on the Chilean equity market measures domestic market influence on equity holdings. As a first
step, the domestic (Chilean) equity return is orthogonalized by regressing it against the other three
returns. Hence, the residuals represent the portion of variation in the domestic index returns that is not
explained by variation in the other three external indices. The residuals become the domestic factors
within the regression model. Dungey and Gajurel (2015) and Bekaert et al. (2014) employ a similar
methodology to measure spillover effects on the equity returns in their studies.
Contagion is defined as the additional or unexpected spillover that may occur during a GFC.
We applied the methodology employed by Dungey and Gajurel (2015) and Bekaert et al. (2014) to
create “crisis” dummies intended to capture the additional spillover, i.e., contagion, which occurs
during a GFC. We identified 2008 as the crisis year associated with the US mortgage crisis, and the
year 2011 as the crisis year associated with the EU debt crisis. Each GFC dummy variables equals zero
in non-crisis years. In 2008, the GFC dummy “Global_crisis_08” equals the 2008 annual return for
one of the three equity market indices, and similarly for the 2011 GFC dummy “Global_crisis_11”.
We estimated a separate model for each of the three foreign spillover markets and a fourth model
with no spillover market. Each model contains both GFC dummies and the model without a spillover
market isolates the impact of variation in the orthogonalized domestic index return on equity holdings.
The relationship between equity holdings and several of the modeled control variables are also
of interest. For example, we controlled for the impact of long-term debt (Percent_bonds) on equity
holdings and interpreted the results in terms of creditor monitoring that is a proxy for external
corporate governance. The liquidity control variables include the annual number of trading days per
company with no change in return (Zero_return_days), and the effective spread (Effective_spread).
Firms operating in the financial sector are identified by a dummy variable (Financial_sector) equal to
“1” for financial sector firms and “0” otherwise. Note that Dungey and Gajurel (2015) restrict their
analysis to firms in the financial sector based on the observation that the banking sector represent a
channel through which contagion may be transmitted across borders. Chilean firms adopted IFRS and
fair value accounting standards during the study period, so we included a control variable based on
the year of adoption, and we expect the requirements for fair market valuation requirements in IFRS
to significantly affect the financial sector. Many firms voluntarily adopted fair value standards early,
and we controlled for early adoption through a dummy variable (Fair_Value) that equals “1” upon
adoption and each year thereafter, and 0 otherwise.
Dungey and Gajurel (2015) and Bekaert et al. (2014) both address the impact of portfolio return
volatility in their multi-country studies of contagion. Bekaert et al. (2014) implicitly control for volatility
by introducing a volatility ratio of market volatility to factor volatility. Dungey and Gajurel (2015)
explicitly model volatility contagion and find that while volatility spillover is common to most countries,
roughly 40% of them experience volatility-driven contagion. Furthermore, they note that volatility
contagion is rarely the only driver of contagion effects and is associated with policy uncertainty too.
Given that the focus of the current study is on a single country, we modeled variation in equity holdings
instead of equity returns, and we defined the average standard deviation of daily returns per company
as our control for “volatility”.
Portfolio turnover and investor herding are measured by the inclusion of lagged dependent
variables on the right-hand side each model. For any given shareholder group, we interpreted a
3 MSCI Inc., is an American Finance Company headquartered in New York City, and it is a global provider of equity, fixed
income, and stock market indexes and multi-asset portfolio analysis tools. Its URL is: https://www.msci.com/.
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statistically significant parameter estimate on lagged equity holdings as a measure of portfolio turnover.
As an extreme example, if equity holdings do not change form one period to another, then this period’s
equity holdings equal last period’s equity holdings, so that the parameter estimate is 1 and the lagged
holdings can explain all the variation in current period equity holdings. Similarly, herding is defined
for shareholder group “i” as a statistically significant parameter estimate on the lagged holdings of
shareholder group “j”. In other words, modeled herding occurs when the trades of one investor group
are highly correlated with the lagged trades of a second investor group4.
The equity holdings of AFP’s, mutual funds, and insiders are modeled in Equation (1) as a function
of the two institutional investors and insiders. The three groups of investors are superscripted with
“i”, “j”, and “k” in Equation (1) below. Thus, for each investor group i, and given two other investor
groups, j and k, the general holdings model is expressed in Equation (1) as:
hi = β0 + β1 Lag_h
i + β2 Lag_h
j + β3 Lag_h
k + β4 Effective_spread + β5 Zero_return_days
+β6 Percentage_bonds + β7 Fair_value + β8 Volatility + β9 Financial_sector
+β10 Domestic_contagion + β11 Spillover_market + β12 Global_crisis_08
+β11 Global_crisis_11 + εi.
The retail investor model is identical to Equation (1), but excludes lagged pension fund and
mutual fund holdings5.
4.1. Hypotheses
Our models separate the equity market response to the two GFC’s into changes in the equity
holdings of four distinct shareholder groups: insiders, local pension funds or AFP’s, mutual funds, and
retail investors. In this context, to provide directional hypotheses, we state our hypotheses in terms of
the type of investor whose holdings are likely to be a mechanism for transmitting the contagion during
a GFC, and those that are not likely to be mechanisms for transmitting the contagion.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Change in the level of local pension fund holdings is not a mechanism for the transmission
of GFC effects to the Chilean financial markets.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Change in the level of mutual fund holdings is not a mechanism for the transmission of
GFC effects to the Chilean financial markets.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Change in the level of retail investor holdings is a mechanism for the transmission of GFC
effects to the Chilean financial markets.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Change in the level of insider holdings is not a mechanism for the transmission of GFC
effects to the Chilean financial markets.
To test the hypotheses, four models were estimated for insiders, mutual funds, pension funds,
and retail investors that complement the studies of Dungey and Gajurel (2015) and Bekaert et al. (2014).
However, as shown above, Equation (1) replaces their dependent variable based on equity returns with
the equity holdings of insiders, mutual funds, pension funds, and retail investors. An analysis based on
equity holdings facilitates an examination of the possibility that institutional managers, retail investors,
4 Durbin-h test indicates the presence of autocorrelation in all models except the insider-holding model. Estimation of the
models with auto regression (AR1) or ordinary least square (OLS) does not have a qualitatively different impact on the
results in Tables 3–6. Further, all continuous variables are standardized with mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.
5 We do not include all four investor groups in a single model because retail investor holdings equal the residual of total
outstanding shares minus the holdings of the other three investor groups. Thus, the holdings of any single group are a linear
combination of the other 3. The current specification provides the best fit to the data, and facilitates a discussion of the
relationship observed in Figure 5 between retail investors and insiders.
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and insiders provide liquidity when market makers pull back from the provision of providing liquidity
during GFC’s.
In summary, AFP managers are relatively passive investors given their mandate to invest the
payroll contributions of Chilean civilians. Mutual funds may have more exposure to global markets
and may have viewed Chile as a relatively safe haven during the 2008 and 2011 GFC’s. Retail investors
are perhaps the least informed group of Chilean investors and this group is most likely to misinterpret
the impact of foreign shocks on domestic fundamentals, and may also be prone to herd behavior
during panics. Insiders are informed traders with superior information on the value of the firm, and
the assumption is that they do not panic during a GFC. As such, insiders should view GFC-driven
panic selling as buying opportunities and add liquidity to the emerging market during sell-offs.
The tradeoff between risk reduction associated with creditor monitoring and increased risk of
default associated with two GFC’s during the study period motivates a fifth hypothesis. Hypothesis
5 tests for the possibility that a higher level of publicly issued debt in the capital structure may
motivate investors to increase equity holdings to take advantage of credit monitoring. The converse
of this hypothesis is that investors held fewer shares in companies with more publicly issued debt
to avoid exposure to a heightened probability of default that generally existed during the study
period. The tradeoffs are particularly interesting in light of the fact that the Chilean banking model is
a traditional deposit-loan model rather than an investment banking/securitization model, which is
also the case in most emerging markets. During normal times, debt is a significant source of funds
for Chilean firms. Total debt represents just over 45% of our sample firms’ capital structure, while
long-term debt represents nearly 25% of our sample firms’ capital structure. Publicly issued long-term
bonds represent close to 12% of the capital structure. The relatively high level of debt in the capital
structure of Chilean companies is explained in part by a high concentration of shares held by insiders
who seek to maintain majority control by issuing debt instead of equity shares (Lefort and Walker 2007).
In emerging markets, Denis and McConnell (2003) note the importance of the ability of creditors
to monitor insiders. Additionally, studies have shown that creditor monitoring is present except
when a country has an easy monetary policy (Lopez-de-Foronda et al. 2018). Thus, by including the
percentage of bond holdings in our models, we allow for the conflicting effects of it on equity holdings,
a heightened probability of default during the study period, potential value of creditor monitoring,
and the possibility of flight to quality (Optiz and Szimayer 2018). Moreover, we allow the data to speak
on the direction of the correlation of this variable with different equity holdings. Thus, we hypothesize
that equity investors recognize a relationship between equity value and the level of debt in the capital
structure during a crisis.
Hypothesis 5 (H5). The equity holdings of mutual funds, local pension funds, and retail investors are sensitive
to the presence of more debt in the capital structure.
4.2. Sample
For hypothesis testing, we used price and volume data provided by the regulators of the Santiago
Stock Exchange, for the period January 2007 through December 2013. Equity holdings were obtained
from the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (SVS) that is also referred to as the Commission
for the Financial Market. Additionally, we collected annual measures of financial statement items
from the Economatica database. Annual equity market returns were obtained from MSCI for Chile,
US, EU, and global stock market indices. Annual equity returns were derived using local currencies.
Real GDP growth rates and components for Chile, EU, and US were obtained from the Statistics
Database Banco Central De Chile. Total portfolio investment was from the International Monetary
Fund Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS—Tables 12 and 13). Household net worth
was from the Organization for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD) Stat, household
dashboard. Further, all firms were required to adopt fair value measurement standards by December
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2013, as prescribed by International Accounting Standards Board6. The final sample includes 63 firms,
which we pooled across the period 2007 through 2013, producing a total of 339-pooled firm years after
removing observations with missing data. Appendix A lists the variables and their definitions.
5. Results
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics that are based on 339 firm years. The high degree of insider
ownership in Chile is evidenced by an average insider ownership level of 53.12%. In contrast, the
average local pension fund holdings were 5.88%, and mutual funds held 7.8% of the outstanding
shares. Retail investors, who control 33.2% of shares, are the second largest shareholders.
Table 1. Mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum (min), and maximum (max) values for the sample.
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Insiders 53.12% 21.30% 0.00% 99.28%
Pension funds 5.88% 6.30% 0.00% 25.11%
Mutual funds 7.80% 9.88% 0.00% 39.00%
Retail 33.20% 23.65% 0.00% 97.09%
Lag_retail 34.32% 23.22% 0.00% 97.09%
Lag_Insiders 52.60% 20.70% 0.00% 97.80%
Lag_Pension funds 6.20% 6.64% 0.00% 25.11%
Lag_Mutual funds 6.89% 9.58% 0.00% 42.49%
Effective_spread 1.52 1.72 0.18 14.41
Zero_return_days 11.28 8.41 1 43
Percent_bonds 11.96% 16.14% 0.00% 83.52%
Volatility 2.67 1.83 0.06 15.34
Financial_sector 0.31 0.46 0 1
Fair_value 30.68% 46.18% 0.00% 100.00%
Domestic_contagion 0.00% 8.67% −10.40% 11.61%
Global spillover 3.30% 12.84% −16.86% 24.06%
US spillover 5.66% 11.88% −12.98% 27.46%
EU spillover 1.03% 16.58% −25.39% 23.48%
Table 2 displays correlations for the study variables. Insider ownership is significant and negatively
correlated with both contemporaneous and lagged values of pension fund and mutual fund holdings,
at p < 0.01 and p < 0.10 levels. As expected, insiders’ ownership is not correlated with any of the
external spillover proxies or the domestic contagion factor, EU Spillover, Global Spillover, and US
Spillover. Further, insiders’ ownership is positively related to the liquidity proxy effective_spread at
the p < 0.05 level. This is consistent with the idea that higher levels of insider ownership suggest less
liquidity and wider effective spreads. The creditor monitoring proxy Percent_bonds is positively and
significantly correlated with the holdings of Insiders, Pension_funds, Lag_insiders, Lag_Pension_funds,
and Lag_mutual_funds at the p < 0.01 level. It is also significant and negatively correlated with holdings
of “Retail” investors at the p < 0.01 level. Fair_value is positively correlated with Pension_funds and
Mutual_funds at the p < 0.10 l and p < 0.01 levels, but negative and significantly correlated with Retail,
Zero_ret_days, and the Financial_sector dummy at the p < 0.05 level. These results suggest that retail
investor behavior is different from the other groups, and the financial sector is less likely to have
adopted fair value reporting of assets and liabilities.
6 All but 7 firms adopted IFRS in 2009, so we omitted those 7 firms. Early adopters of IFRS 13 provided levels 1–3 fair value
measurements in their financial statements, thus, they had recognized (not simply disclosed) fair value measurement before
the mandated date of December 2013.
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Table 2. Pearson correlation matrix.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1. 1. Insiders 1
2. 2. Pension funds −0.164 *** 1
3. 3. Mutual funds −0.102 * 0.448 1
4. 4. Retail −0.814 *** −0.305 −0.444 1
5. 5. Lag_retail −0.738 *** −0.288 −0.395 0.906 *** 1
6. 6. Lag_Insiders 0.918 −0.146 *** −0.066 −0.761 *** −0.818 *** 1
7. 7. Lag_Pension funds −0.141 *** 0.922 *** 0.406 −0.288 −0.297 −0.154 *** 1
8. 8. Lag_Mutual funds −0.098 * 0.376 0.820 *** −0.354 −0.451 −0.071 0.361 1
9. 9. Effective_spread 0.138 ** −0.268 −0.435 0.128 ** 0.131 ** 0.123 ** −0.261 −0.405 1
10. 10. Zero_return_days −0.102 * −0.131 ** −0.255 0.233 0.250 −0.126 ** −0.133 ** −0.240 −0.062 1
11. 11. Percent_bonds 0.150 *** 0.307 *** 0.281 *** −0.334 *** −0.289 *** 0.145 *** 0.286 *** 0.188 *** −0.250 0.055 1
12. 12. Volatility 0.005 −0.155 *** −0.269 0.149 *** 0.168 *** −0.012 −0.146 *** −0.281 0.440 −0.176 *** −0.226 1
13. 13. Financial_sector 0.145 *** −0.426 −0.313 0.113 ** 0.089 0.148 −0.448 −0.225 0.087 0.168 *** −0.119 ** 0.019 1
14. 14. Fair_value 0.088 0.095 * 0.196 *** −0.187 *** −0.238 0.111 0.135 ** 0.242 −0.264 −0.135 ** 0.105 * −0.233 −0.113 ** 1
15. 15. Domestic_contagion 0.102 0.037 0.002 0.000 −0.023 0.008 0.038 0.012 −0.083 −0.166 *** 0.037 −0.006 0.015 0.112 ** 1
16. 16. Global spillover −0.021 −0.055 0.038 0.018 −0.060 −0.010 −0.040 0.198 *** −0.192 *** −0.043 −0.066 −0.138** 0.003 0.202 *** 0.00 1
17. 17. US spillover −0.024 −0.067 0.044 0.021 −0.053 −0.022 −0.048 0.212 −0.214 −0.094 * −0.084 −0.135** 0.008 0.223 0.00 0.974 *** 1
18. 18. EU spillover −0.021 −0.050 0.038 0.016 −0.064 −0.003 −0.036 0.190 *** −0.174 *** −0.010 −0.053 −0.123** 0.001 0.188 *** 0.00 0.983 *** 0.924 ***
In all the tables, *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and * significant at 10%.
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Note that Domestic_contagion in column 15 of Table 2 is uncorrelated with the spillover proxies EU
Spillover, Global Spillover, and US Spillover. This is the result of orthogonalizing Domestic_contagion
against the spillover proxies. However, the spillover proxies are highly correlated with each other,
so we avoided collinearity issues within regressions by running a separate regression for each spillover
market in addition to a baseline regression with no spillover markets. The outcome of this estimation
strategy is that it allows Domestic_contagion to appear in all regressions to isolate the impact of the
orthogonalized domestic market effect after controlling for external market effects.
Regression results for the equity holdings of AFP’s, mutual funds, retail investors, and insiders
are summarized in Tables 3–6, respectively. Each table contains four models with each model identified
by the variable “Spillover_market”. Model 1 has no spillover market and serves as the baseline model.
Spillover_Market equals EU Spillover in Model 2, Global Spillover in Model 3, and US Spillover in
Model 4. Recall from our discussion that spillover refers to the expected cross-border co-movement
in asset prices, while the term “contagion” refers to unexpected or excessive spillover. With these
definitions in mind, the variables “Global_crisis_08” and “Global_crisis_11” measure contagion effects
associated with the US mortgage crisis in 2008 and the EU debt crisis in 2011. Each of those variables is
“0” during non-crisis years and take on the value of the spillover variable in crisis years. The same
methodology was employed by Bekaert et al. (2014) and Dungey and Gajurel (2015) to measure
contagion effects.
Table 3. Regression AR1 coefficient estimates of pension fund holdings on contagion models for the
2008 and 2011 global financial crises (t-stats).
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Intercept 0.019 −0.056 −0.035 −0.011
(0.307) (−1.149) (−0.742) (−0.249)
Lag_insiders −0.007 −0.012 −0.009 −0.008
(−0.298) (−0.486) (−0.377) (−0.309)
Lag_pension_funds 0.856 *** 0.851 *** 0.854 *** 0.856 ***
(30.808) (30.621) (30.737) (30.774)
Lag_mutual_funds 0.051 * 0.048 * 0.049 * 0.050 *
(1.888) (1.794) (1.831) (1.861)
Zero_return_days −0.020 −0.032 −0.024 −0.020
(−0.831) (−1.286) (−0.992) (−0.818)
Effective_spread −0.038 −0.045 * −0.041 −0.038
(−1.462) (−1.709) (−1.557) (−1.465)
Percent_bonds 0.036 0.043 * 0.043 * 0.041
(1.475) (1.770) (1.738) (1.645)
Volatility −0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001
(−0.121) (0.070) (0.086) (0.034)
Fair_value −0.079 −0.066 −0.073 −0.077
(−1.461) (−1.213) (−1.344) (−1.430)
Financial_sector −0.043 −0.040 −0.041 −0.042
(−0.750) (−0.700) (−0.729) (−0.747)
Domestic_contagion 0.035 0.064 ** 0.055 * 0.048 *
(1.351) (2.236) (1.950) (1.707)
Global_crisis_08 −0.028 *** −0.018 *** −0.022 *** −0.021 **
(−2.613) (−3.233) (−2.853) (−2.483)
Global_crisis_11 −0.0036 −0.0062 −0.0076 −0.0039
(−0.459) (−0.843) (−0.528) (−0.107)
Spillover_market 0.103 ** 0.075 * 0.043
(2.268) (1.760) (1.174)
Adj. R2 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832
In all the tables, *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and * significant at 10%.
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Table 4. Regression AR1 coefficient estimates of mutual fund holdings on contagion models for the
2008 and 2011 global financial crises (t-stats).
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Intercept 0.010 0.005 0.041 0.051
(0.186) (0.074) (0.650) (0.876)
Lag_insiders −0.010 −0.010 −0.008 −0.009
(−0.287) (−0.295) (−0.249) (−0.274)
Lag_pension_funds 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.021
(0.587) (0.580) (0.602) (0.571)
Lag_mutual_funds 0.682 *** 0.681 *** 0.683 *** 0.682 ***
(18.624) (18.577) (18.638) (18.681)
Zero_return_days −0.110 *** −0.110 *** −0.107 *** −0.110 ***
(−3.325) (−3.275) (−3.231) (−3.349)
Effective_spread −0.152 *** −0.153 *** −0.151 *** −0.153 ***
(−4.256) (−4.240) (−4.212) (−4.271)
Percent_bonds 0.102 *** 0.103 *** 0.098 *** 0.094 ***
(3.102) (3.083) (2.920) (2.812)
Volatility −0.010 −0.010 −0.014 −0.017
(−0.308) (−0.297) (−0.404) (−0.505)
Fair_value −0.032 −0.031 −0.036 −0.035
(−0.436) (−0.421) (−0.492) (−0.478)
Financial_sector −0.235 *** −0.235 *** −0.236 *** −0.235 ***
(−3.073) (−3.064) (−3.086) (−3.087)
Domestic_contagion 0.014 0.016 0.001 −0.010
(0.405) (0.412) (0.012) (−0.266)
Global_crisis_08 −0.060 *** −0.015 ** −0.014 −0.014
(−4.134) (−2.036) (−1.376) (−1.165)
Global_crisis_11 0.006 −0.006 −0.001 0.005
(0.574) (−0.542) (−0.032) (0.105)
Spillover_market 0.007 −0.051 −0.078
(0.114) (−0.865) (−1.558)
Adj. R2 0.696 0.695 0.697 0.698
In all the tables, *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level.
Hypothesis H1 states that change in the level of pension fund or AFP holdings is not a mechanism
for the transmission of GFC effects into the Chilean financial market. The results in Table 3 below
contain no evidence to reject H1. The parameters on the contagion variable Global_crisis_08 are
negative and significant at p < 0.05 across all spillover markets (i.e., β = −0.028 for the baseline Model
1, β = −0.018 for the EU Model 2, β = −0.022 for the Global Model 3, and β = −0.021 for the US
Model 4). Additionally, the only spillover market with a p-value below 0.05 is the EU market with a
positive relationship to AFP equity holdings. An interpretation is that the equity holdings of AFP’s
are positively correlated with EU equity market returns during normal times and increase along with
increases in the return to EU equity. However, during the 2008 GFC, the equity holdings of AFP’s
increased as the return in all foreign equity markets declined. Thus, AFP’s do not appear to be a
source of the transmission for the contagion Chile experienced during the 2008 GFC as identified by
Bekaert et al. (2014) and Dungey and Gajurel (2015). Furthermore, the lack of significance between
the equity holdings of AFP’s and the crisis variable “Global_crisis_11” indicates that pension fund
holdings were largely unaffected by the 2011 GFC. Therefore, our results support hypothesis H1 that
AFP’s were not a source of transmission of the 2008 and 2011 crises.
Hypothesis H2 states that change in the level of mutual fund holdings is not a mechanism for
the transmission of GFC effects. Table 4 below shows that none of the Spillover_market effects are
significant. The measure of contagion, Global_crisis_08, is negative and significant for the Chilean
market (β = −0.060, p < 0.01 in Model 1) and the EU market (β = −0.015, p < 0.05 in Model 2).
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These results suggest that the equity holdings of mutual funds increased as the returns on the Chilean
equity market and the EU equity market declined during the 2008 GFC. Thus, mutual funds were not a
mechanism for the transmission of contagion during the 2008 GFC. Additionally, the Global_crisis_11
estimates are not significant across all markets. Further, the lack of significance on the estimate for
Domestic_contagion implies there is no evidence of a domestic effect on mutual fund holdings either.
Therefore, we accept hypothesis H2: the holdings of mutual funds did not serve as a transmission
mechanism for contagion during the 2008 GFC.
Table 5. Regression AR1 coefficient estimates of retail investor holdings on contagion models for the
2008 and 2011 global financial crises (t-stats).
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Intercept 0.005 0.011 0.013 0.018
(0.119) (0.213) (0.267) −0.264
Lag_insiders −0.136 *** −0.136 *** −0.136 *** −0.136 ***
(−2.836) (−2.835) (−2.835) (−2.833)
Lag_retail 0.751 *** 0.751 *** 0.751 *** 0.751 ***
(14.963) (14.899) (14.928) (14.943)
Zero_ret_days 0.043 * 0.044 * 0.044 * 0.043 *
(1.691) (1.694) (1.707) −1.685
Effective_spread 0.053 * 0.053 * 0.053 * 0.052 *
(1.876) (1.882) (1.883) −1.871
Percent_bonds −0.083 *** −0.083 *** −0.083 *** −0.083 ***
(−3.293) (−3.285) (−3.293) (−3.300)
Volatility −0.004 −0.004 −0.005 −0.005
(−0.148) (−0.161) (−0.177) (−0.187)
Fair_value 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.034
(0.632) (0.609) (0.612) −0.622
Financial_sector 0.100 * 0.099 * 0.100 * 0.100 *
(1.808) (1.799) (1.802) −1.807
Domestic_contagion −0.002 −0.005 −0.006 −0.006
(−0.069) (−0.152) (−0.188) (−0.210)
Global_crisis_08 0.037 *** 0.010 * 0.015 * 0.020 **
(3.252) (1.685) (1.895) −2.147
Global_crisis_11 −0.005 0.005 0.011 −0.027
(−0.595) (0.595) (0.653) (−0.668)
Spillover_market −0.010 −0.014 −0.014
(−0.189) (−0.286) (−0.333)
Adj. R2 0.827 0.828 0.828 0.827
In all the tables, *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and * significant at 10%.
Hypothesis H3 states that change in the level of retail investor holding is a mechanism for the
transmission of GFC effects. Table 5 below shows that in contrast to the negative sign on the set of
crisis dummies for mutual fund and pension fund holdings, the signs on the parameter estimates for
Global_crisis_08 are positive and significant for the Chilean market (β = 0.037, p < 0.01 in Model 1)
and the US market (β = 0.020, p < 0.05 in Model 4). Significance is marginal for the relationship with
the EU and Global equity markets in Models 2 and 3, with p < 0.10. These results indicate that lower
equity returns in the local Chilean market and the US market during the 2008 GFC are associated
with lower retail investor holdings, and allowing for marginal significance on the EU and global
markets, the result holds for all three foreign markets. Hence, declines in the equity holdings of retail
investors during the 2008 GFC may have been a source of transmission of the domestic contagion
in Chile as identified by Bekaert et al. (2014) and the idiosyncratic contagion in Chile identified by
Dungey and Gajurel (2015). The lack of significance between the equity holdings of retail investors
and the proxy for the Global_crisis_11 contagion suggests that retail investors did not facilitate the
transmission of the contagion during the 2011 GFC. Since we identified retail investors as a source of
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transmission for the contagion associated with the 2008 crisis, but not the 2011 GFC, we conclude that
there is mixed evidence to support hypothesis H3.
Hypothesis H4 states that change in the level of insider holdings is not a mechanism for the
transmission of GFC effects to the Chilean financial markets. Table 6 below show that across all models,
there is no significant evidence for insiders being affected by the Chilean equity market or the foreign
markets. In fact, the only parameter estimate of significance is on lagged insider holdings (β = 0.904,
p < 0.01) across all the models. It appears that the trades of insiders are driven by variables outside
the scope of the study. Given this result and the failure to find any significant estimates on the crisis
dummies, we conclude that there is support for hypothesis H4, suggesting that insiders do not change
their equity holdings during crisis periods. Hence, as suspected, insiders may be failing to provide
liquidity during a GFC that they normally do during a non-crisis period.
Table 6. Regression AR1 coefficient estimates of insider holdings on contagion models for the 2008 and
2011 global financial crises (t-stats).
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model 4)
Intercept −0.012 0.003 −0.023 −0.034
(−0.321) (0.070) (−0.478) (−0.769)
Lag_insiders 0.904 *** 0.905 *** 0.904 *** 0.904 ***
(37.245) (37.073) (37.188) (37.281)
Lag_pension_funds 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014
(0.503) (0.524) (0.498) (0.515)
Lag_mutual_funds −0.031 −0.030 −0.031 −0.031
(−1.113) (−1.092) (−1.122) (−1.130)
Zero_return_days 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.006
(0.217) (0.306) (0.184) (0.227)
Effective_spread 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.020
(0.732) (0.775) (0.715) (0.737)
Percent_bonds 0.028 0.027 0.029 0.032
(1.141) (1.067) (1.182) (1.283)
Volatility 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.009
(0.237) (0.201) (0.274) (0.354)
Fair_value −0.003 −0.005 −0.001 −0.001
(−0.048) (−0.097) (−0.025) (−0.020)
financial_sector 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.026
(0.472) (0.460) (0.475) (0.471)
Domestic_contagion −0.025 −0.032 −0.020 −0.012
(−0.950) (−1.065) (−0.693) (−0.411)
Global_crisis_08 0.001 0.003 −0.002 −0.007
(0.107) (0.481) (−0.261) (−0.760)
Global_crisis_11 0.005 −0.002 −0.011 0.036
(0.610) (−0.217) (−0.712) (0.899)
Spillover_market −0.024 0.017 0.040
(−0.489) (0.369) (1.016)
Adj. R2 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.836
In all the tables, *** Significant at the 1% level.
With regard to the effect of creditor monitoring, hypothesis H5 states that the holdings of local
pension funds, mutual funds, and retail investors are sensitive to the level of public debt issued by
Chilean firms. The creditor monitoring proxy Percent_bonds is positive and significant in Table 3
above for pension funds. The mutual fund models in Table 4 contains estimates on Percent_bonds that
are positive and significant across all models (at β = 0.094 to 0.103, p < 0.05). However, the results for
retail investor holdings in Table 5 reveal that the estimate on Percent_bonds is negative and significant
(at β = −0.083, p < 0.01 across all models). Thus, we conclude that the results provide support for
hypothesis H5. It seems that retail investors held fewer shares in companies with more debt, perhaps
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due to imperfect information that led them to infer a higher probability of default. In contrast, mutual
funds and pension funds (marginally significant) held more shares in firms with more debt in the
capital structure, a result perhaps related to the value they place on the monitoring of management by
creditors, an important external corporate governance mechanism.
6. Discussion
In Table 4, for mutual fund holdings, the Financial_sector dummy enters all the models as negative
and significant (i.e., β = −0.235, p < 0.01), but positive and significant across all models for retail
investors in Table 5 (i.e., β = 0.10, p < 0.10). A study of the banking sector firms’ market reaction to
the fair value accounting (FVA) and impairment rules during the 2008 crisis by Bowen and Khan
(2014, p. 233) found that “investors acted as if the potential negative effects of then-existing FVA
and impairment rules outweighed any benefits associated with having more timely and transparent
mark-to-market data for decision making”. Thus, it may be that risk-averse mutual fund managers
avoided shares of financial institutions during these two crisis periods. This could be related to
contagion if mutual fund managers were biased away from investing in financial institutions, given
the uncertainty surrounding their exposure to US mortgage-backed securities and EU sovereign debt
defaults. Thus, while creditor monitoring may have motivated institutional investors to increase equity
holdings during a period highlighted by two severe GFC’s, uncertainty regarding the precise nature of
assets on the balance sheets of financial institutions and a failure to transparently recognize impairment
losses on their investments may have had a negative and offsetting effect. Therefore, weaker regulation
of firms within the financial sector may have hastened the outflow of funds through a reduction in
mutual fund holdings across the study period.
Table 7 below compares our generalized spillover and contagion results to the Chilean results
in studies by Bekaert et al. (2014) and Dungey and Gajurel (2015). Table 7 shows that our results for
retail investors provide a possible source for the Bekaert et al. (2014) and Dungey and Gajurel (2015)
findings for Chilean contagion during the 2008 crisis. Moreover, there is no evidence that the 2011
GFC had any contagion effects on Chile’s equity market, which we attribute to improved regulations,
creditor monitoring, and fair value measurement following IFRS adoption.
We provided insights into potential herding behavior among the four investor groups,
by considering the lagged values of ownership holdings. Table 3 indicates that across all models,
the current period holdings of pension funds are a positive and a marginally significant function of
the prior period’s mutual fund holdings (e.g., β = 0.051, p < 0.10 on Lag_Mutual_funds). This result
supports the possibility that local pension funds or AFP managers base at least a portion of their
trading decisions on the prior period’s mutual fund trades, which we note in Table 7 as pension funds’
herding behavior. Brown et al. (2013) attribute institutional herding to reputational effects. However,
in the Chilean context, it is unlikely that the AFP managers with perhaps superior information on the
Chilean economy were motivated by reputational effects to follow mutual funds. Thus, our results
are probably not consistent with Brown et al.’s (2013) study. For mutual funds, the Chilean equity
market may have provided a relatively less risky and fundamentally sound investment opportunity
compared to global equity markets in the US and EU. Kabir (2018) studied herding in the context of
the US financial sector and found evidence for “spurious” herding, which he defined as unintentional
herding driven by fundamental factors. Given the Chilean institutional context, spurious herding,
as suggested by Kabir (2018), rather than a reputation-based explanation, probably drives our result
for AFP managers’ herding behavior.
In Table 5, a relationship exists between retail investors and lagged insiders, but it is a negative
function of Lag_insider holdings (β = −0.136, p < 0.01 across all models). A possible explanation is that
when insiders trade shares, retail investors are on the other side of the trade, hence the negative sign
on Lag_Insiders. However, the result is not contemporaneous and warrants further study in future
emerging market contagion research.
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Table 7. Comparing this study’s result coefficients for spillover and contagion with other studies
(pos = positive, neg = negative).
Summary of Ownership and Contagion Results of This Study Returns and Contagion Studies







d_factor pos ** 0 0 0
g_ret neg ** 0 0 0 pos
e_ret neg ** 0 0 0
u_ret 0 0 0 0 neg
d_gfc_2008 neg ** neg ** pos *** 0 pos
d_gfc_2011 0 0 0 0
g_gfc_2008 neg *** 0 pos * 0 pos pos
g_gfc_2011 0 0 0 0
e_gfc_2008 neg *** neg ** pos * 0 pos
e_gfc_2011 0 0 0 0
u_gfc_2008 neg ** 0 pos * 0 pos neg
u_gfc_2011 0 0 0 0
herding pos *, withMutual funds no
neg ***, with
Insiders no yes
In all the tables, *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and * significant at 10%.
7. Conclusions
In this study, the methodology of Bekaert et al. (2014) and Dungey and Gajurel (2015) was
modified to facilitate an analysis of contagion, creditor monitoring, and herding in terms of equity
holdings instead of equity returns during a period that includes the 2008 US mortgage crisis and the
2011 EU debt crisis. One conclusion was that publicly traded shares of Chilean firms became more
concentrated in the hands of mutual funds and pension funds during the 2008 US mortgage crisis,
and less concentrated in the hands of retail investors. Thus, retail investors served as a mechanism
to transmit contagion to Chile’s stock market during the 2008 global financial crisis, while changes
in the equity holdings of institutional investors tended to mitigate the transmission of the contagion.
However, the same result does not apply to the 2011 EU debt crisis. None of the four investor groups’
equity holdings served to mitigate or magnify contagion effects during the 2011 crisis, and we suggested
possible reasons for it. A second finding was of potential herding behavior in the Chilean equity market.
The results indicate that variation in lagged mutual fund holdings explain a statistically significant
portion of the variation in current period local pension fund or AFPs holdings during this period.
Another result pertains to the relationship between creditor monitoring and the equity holdings
of institutional investors. Results show that high levels of publicly issued debt in the capital structure
of Chilean firms are associated with higher pension fund and mutual fund equity holdings. In contrast,
the equity holdings of retail investors are lower in companies with higher levels of publicly issued
debt. It appears that during a period defined by two substantial financial crises, institutional investors
favored firms with more public debt in their capital structure, while retail investors may have associated
a higher probability of default with more debt. The result suggests that in emerging markets during
crisis periods, institutional investors prefer to invest in companies with greater potential for creditor
monitoring of management, while retail investors may fear a greater risk of default. Thus, it does not
automatically follow that firms with greater debt are more likely to have greater outflows.
Some local institutional investors have a relatively steady flow of funds regardless of market
conditions. This is particularly true of Chilean pension funds, given that payroll deduction is the
source of their investable funds. It is plausible that greater opaqueness prior to IFRS adoption in
2009 led institutional investors to continue to invest in Chilean equities at historical rates during the
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2008 crisis, but not during the post IFRS adoption period containing the 2011 EU crisis. In other
words, it is possible that an increase in transparency associated with fair value reporting allowed
fund managers to differentiate companies by risk and adjust their investment strategies accordingly,
particularly in the financial sector. If true, then IFRS adoption during the study period may explain
the finding that institutional investors mitigated contagion during the 2008 crisis, but not during
the 2011 crisis. A major limitation of the study is that it covers only the Chilean stock market that
has less than 70 actively traded firms. Nevertheless, the conjectures that we raised warrant further
analysis, and we encourage future research to pursue this line of investigation to identify the sources of
contagion transmission into other emerging capital markets by extending Bekaert et al.’s (2014) model
and studying the benefits of having an active bond market.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Study Variables and Definitions.
Variables Definitions
insiders The percentage of outstanding shares held by the top 10 shareholders.
pension_funds The investment of AFP’s measured as the percentage of shares held by local pension funds.
mutual_funds The percentage of outstanding shares held by all other institutional investors.
retail The percentage of outstanding shares not held by insiders and institutional investors.
pct_bonds The percentage value of publicly issued bonds to total equity.
spillover_market The annual return for each of three foreign equity markets:
EU Spillover—the annual return for the “MSCI European stock market Index”,
Global Spillover—the annual return for the “MSCI World Index”, and
US Spillover—the annual return for the “MSCI US stock market Index”.
Global_crisis_08 Dummy variable that equals spillover_market in 2008, 0 otherwise.
Global_crisis_11 Dummy variable that equals spillover_market in 2011, 0 otherwise.
Domestic_contagion “domestic factor”—the orthogonalized annual return of the Chilean equity market
against EU Spillover, Global Spillover, and US Spillover.
Control Variables
volatility The annual average standard deviation of the daily stock return for each company.
zero_return_days The number of each company’s trading days per year with a 0% return.
fair_value 1 if the firm uses fair value reporting, 0 otherwise.
fin_dum 1 if the firm is in the financial sector, 0 otherwise.
es Effective spread—trading cost defined as:
Trade execution price-midpoint of quoted spread divided quoted spread.
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